Article published in: Anuarul Laboratorului pentru analiza conflictului transnistrean, Volume I, No. 1 / 2017, Sibiu, Romania, pp. 41-45.
Abstract: The domestic vulnerabilities first maintain unresolved
the Transnistrian conflict since 1992 until now. The lack of effective
governance (the stolen $ billion from National Bank) has made the Moldovan
state not attractive for the population from Transnistrian area. However, external factors
play also an important role. Lately, changes have taken place in regional and
global security environment: amplification of the Russian factor, re-shaping of
the role of EU after Brexit, changes in US approach to security issues after D.
Trump's election. Experts in Transnistrian conflict analysis should take into account all
these elements, together with the internal ones.
Keywords: Transnistrian Conflict, Security Environment,
Republic of Moldova, External Factors, Russian Federation, European Union,
Romania.
Introduction
There are premises to say that
domestic vulnerabilities are the ones that maintain unresolved the
Transnistrian conflict from 1992 to the present .
The lack of effective governance has made the territory, controlled by the
Chisinau authorities, to be not attractive for the population from
Transnistrian area. The one billion US dollars, stolen from the reserves of the
National Bank of Moldova (with the subsequent abolition of the largest, the
only state commercial bank – Banca de Economii a Moldovei [BEM], the concession
of Chisinau international airport and the concession of the southern part of
the republic, in dubious conditions, for the exploration of shale gas, have
made the inhabitants of Transnistria to look cautiously to the Republic of
Moldova. However, indisputable, the external factor plays a very important role
in the Transnistrian conflict. In the last period, changes have taken place in
the regional (Eastern Europe) and global security environment: Russian factor
amplification, changing the US approach tom security issues after President
Donald Trump's election, re-shaping the role of the EU after Brexit and others.
All these elements affect the situation on the banks of the Nistru River
and, together with the internal ones, should be taken into account by experts
in Transnistrian conflict analysis.
That is why the Transnistrian
conflict should be analyzed in the context of the changes in regional and
global security environment. One of the perspectives is to look at it through
the prism of European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in the context of the Russia – West contradictions, completed with
sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia
after the annexation of the Crimea and supporting the rebel troops in Eastern Ukraine. Russia also responded with
sanctions – with restrictions on EU food imports.
The EU
role in Conflict Resolution in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries: the Moldovan
case
The European Union as a collective of its member
states is concerned with conflicts from its neighborhood, because the security
from this area is a condition of its own security and wealth (prosperity). The
EU is vitally interested in having as neighbors a community of values, such as
democracy, human rights, rule of law etc., which is a guaranty for stable
development and for modernization of any country.
Among the EU neighbors are fragile and
conflict-affected countries. One of these states is the Republic of Moldova,
which, since 1992, faces a frozen conflict in the Eastern part of its territory .
Unfortunately, Chisinau authorities have difficulties in addressing effectively
the conflict; they do not have a vision and, respectively, a strategy for
conflict resolution. More than that, businesses with economic agents from
uncontrolled territory bring income to legal authorities, that is why there is
a lack of political will to solve the conflict.
The European Union has clear interests in stabilizing
its Eastern neighborhood. However, since now, its action beyond its boundaries
has been limited. The experience from the Eastern Partnership Program
showed that the financial assistance – for governments of neighboring
countries, which declared themselves “pro-European integration”, but in fact
are suspected of corruption and embezzlement by domestic societies and by
international actors – is not quite effective in helping the societies from
those countries. EU must find other, more effective, ways to contribute to the
stabilization and modernization of those countries. Understanding very well
that the conflicts outside the Union, at the EU borders, are dangerous and are
potential outbreaks for the EU destabilization, Brussels must participate in conflict
management and in conflict resolution – in finding solutions for the conflicts.
Undoubtedly, EU must have an efficient approach to
conflicts and crises in fragile and conflict-affected countries, to contribute
to their development, by designing and applying a common strategic vision of
conflict prevention (before crises emerge or violence erupts). From the
perspective of societies from the Eastern European countries, which want to
become parts of the European family, EU is the only supporter, which can help
by imposing conditions on authorities from their own countries.
Still, the European Neighborhood Policy and the
European Security Strategy must take into account the specificity of fragile
states, which, in many cases are captured (the state institutions are captured
by some oligarchic groups). Often, to help from outside a captured state means
to help the oligarchic regime from that state.
The EU is an important actor, which plays and will
play a special role in regional and in global context in conflict management
and in conflict resolution. That is why it is important for Brussels
to develop relations with real pro-European political forces and experts from
civil societies of neighboring countries (including from Moldova), in order to help those
countries (nations), not dubious (corrupted) political regimes.
The
amplification of the Russian factor in Eastern European region
It is well known that Russian federation is now in a
period of military revival. That is why the Russian leadership takes measures
in order to reinforce the Russian sphere of influence on the territories of the
former Soviet Union (and even further – for example in Middle
East). Russian President is already cold in Russia
“collector of Russian lands” (собиратель земель русских). Moldova is one
of targets in this context of the amplification of the Russian factor in
Eastern European region (as well as in further important geopolitical areas).
Eastern Europe is a disputable space between Russia and West, especially after the
affirmation of the European aspirations of Ukraine,
Georgia and Moldova
(they all are parts of the Eastern Partnership – a program within the European
Neighborhood Policy) and after signing association agreements by these three
countries.
One of the instruments used by Russia in order to stop the exit of
the former Soviet republics from the Russian sphere of influence is the
inspiration and the informational, financial, logistical, military support of
separatist movements in neighboring countries. First this instrument was used
in Republic of Moldova,
in Georgia, and finally in Ukraine.
It is now recognized by many experts, military stuff and state officials that
Russia carries out a hybrid war against some former Soviet countries, in order:
to stop their aspirations of European integration (mainly, it is about Ukraine,
Georgia and Republic of Moldova). A hybrid war
means:
1. To use the Russian speaking minorities from those
countries as a fifths column, in order to destabilize the political situation
from the society,
2. To use propaganda (an information warfare), also to
destabilize the internal situation from the target country (which is an
assault on societal security of the country).
3. To use intelligence methods in order to collect
information ant to influence political leadership and societies perception of
the target countries.
A hybrid war is always an asymmetric one, a war aimed
at using all means before the involvement of the military troops.
Moldova is a
target country and that is why it is in great danger. Unfortunately, the
“pro-European” governance seems not to realize the danger.
In contemporary historical period, we can see a
process of transition of international security system, from the unipolar to
multipolar one. It is undoubted, that in these conditions, Russia wants to be an international/geopolitical
power pole, together with USA,
China,
and other emerging countries. That is why, Kremlin will not accept to withdraw
its influence, its military presence from the territories, which once where
part of the Russian (Tsarist) Empire and of Soviet Union.
Even in the context of facing of some financial problems by Russia, after the
annexation of Crimea and in the context of supporting of the 5 million
population from Lugansk and Donetsk Eastern regions of Ukraine, together with
the enormous costs of the Russian military operation in Syria, Russia will not
accept to yield Transnistrian region to Moldova. That shows the importance of
the external factor within the process of searching of a lasting solution to
the Transnistrian conflict.
Conclusions
The most important geopolitical canter of the Western
civilization is Washington. After the D. Trump's
election, the community of experts in security field expected some changes in
US approach to security issues over the world, including Eastern
Europe. However, eventually, Trump’s administration has taken over
the major lines of US
foreign policy, ensuring continuity. Now can be seen contradictions between Russia and USA, NATO and EU (the collective
West). In the context of Russia
– West contradictions, the Transnistrian conflict is a point of a low interest,
in comparison with Ukraine, Syria and North Korea. Still, Transnistria
and Moldova as a whole, is a
bridgehead for Russia in
Balkan direction – in a region where traditionally Moscow had political interests in Slavic and
orthodox countries. That is why Russia
will use all means to stop the process of conflict resolution, in order to help
the Tiraspol’s
regime to strengthen its control on the territory.
In these conditions, it is obvious that a change of
the Russia’s status in 5+2 format of negotiations on Transnistrian conflict
resolution, from mediator and guarantor to a part of the conflict (as
the Russian president Boris Yeltsin signed the Peace Agreement from 21 July
1992), will transform the format of negotiations into an mechanism better
corresponding to reality. This would be very helpful in the attempt to find a
solution to the conflict in the international format of negotiations.
However, the main problems, which must be solved in
order to face effectively Transnistrian conflict, are internal: corruption,
embezzlement, the lack of a state vision, of a state project, of the state
building, of an effective economic development, which makes Moldova unattractive for Transnistrian
population, even if Russia
would express the readiness to withdraw its military troops from the
region.
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