TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF RUSSIA – WEST CONTRADICTIONS

Article published in: Anuarul Laboratorului pentru analiza conflictului transnistrean, Volume I, No. 1 / 2017, Sibiu, Romania, pp. 41-45. 

Abstract: The domestic vulnerabilities first maintain unresolved the Transnistrian conflict since 1992 until now. The lack of effective governance (the stolen $ billion from National Bank) has made the Moldovan state not attractive for the population from Transnistrian area. However, external factors play also an important role. Lately, changes have taken place in regional and global security environment: amplification of the Russian factor, re-shaping of the role of EU after Brexit, changes in US approach to security issues after D. Trump's election. Experts in Transnistrian conflict analysis should take into account all these elements, together with the internal ones.

Keywords: Transnistrian Conflict, Security Environment, Republic of Moldova, External Factors, Russian Federation, European Union, Romania.

Introduction 

There are premises to say that domestic vulnerabilities are the ones that maintain unresolved the Transnistrian conflict from 1992 to the present [1]. The lack of effective governance has made the territory, controlled by the Chisinau authorities, to be not attractive for the population from Transnistrian area. The one billion US dollars, stolen from the reserves of the National Bank of Moldova (with the subsequent abolition of the largest, the only state commercial bank – Banca de Economii a Moldovei [BEM], the concession of Chisinau international airport and the concession of the southern part of the republic, in dubious conditions, for the exploration of shale gas, have made the inhabitants of Transnistria to look cautiously to the Republic of Moldova. However, indisputable, the external factor plays a very important role in the Transnistrian conflict. In the last period, changes have taken place in the regional (Eastern Europe) and global security environment: Russian factor amplification, changing the US approach tom security issues after President Donald Trump's election, re-shaping the role of the EU after Brexit and others. All these elements affect the situation on the banks of the Nistru River and, together with the internal ones, should be taken into account by experts in Transnistrian conflict analysis.

That is why the Transnistrian conflict should be analyzed in the context of the changes in regional and global security environment. One of the perspectives is to look at it through the prism of European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in the context of the Russia – West contradictions, completed with sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia after the annexation of the Crimea and supporting the rebel troops in Eastern Ukraine. Russia also responded with sanctions – with restrictions on EU food imports.

The EU role in Conflict Resolution in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries: the Moldovan case

The European Union as a collective of its member states is concerned with conflicts from its neighborhood, because the security from this area is a condition of its own security and wealth (prosperity). The EU is vitally interested in having as neighbors a community of values, such as democracy, human rights, rule of law etc., which is a guaranty for stable development and for modernization of any country.

Among the EU neighbors are fragile and conflict-affected countries. One of these states is the Republic of Moldova, which, since 1992, faces a frozen conflict in the Eastern part of its territory [2]. Unfortunately, Chisinau authorities have difficulties in addressing effectively the conflict; they do not have a vision and, respectively, a strategy for conflict resolution. More than that, businesses with economic agents from uncontrolled territory bring income to legal authorities, that is why there is a lack of political will to solve the conflict.       

The European Union has clear interests in stabilizing its Eastern neighborhood. However, since now, its action beyond its boundaries has been limited. The experience from the Eastern Partnership Program [3] showed that the financial assistance – for governments of neighboring countries, which declared themselves “pro-European integration”, but in fact are suspected of corruption and embezzlement by domestic societies and by international actors – is not quite effective in helping the societies from those countries. EU must find other, more effective, ways to contribute to the stabilization and modernization of those countries. Understanding very well that the conflicts outside the Union, at the EU borders, are dangerous and are potential outbreaks for the EU destabilization, Brussels must participate in conflict management and in conflict resolution – in finding solutions for the conflicts.

Undoubtedly, EU must have an efficient approach to conflicts and crises in fragile and conflict-affected countries, to contribute to their development, by designing and applying a common strategic vision of conflict prevention (before crises emerge or violence erupts). From the perspective of societies from the Eastern European countries, which want to become parts of the European family, EU is the only supporter, which can help by imposing conditions on authorities from their own countries.

Still, the European Neighborhood Policy and the European Security Strategy must take into account the specificity of fragile states, which, in many cases are captured (the state institutions are captured by some oligarchic groups). Often, to help from outside a captured state means to help the oligarchic regime from that state.

The EU is an important actor, which plays and will play a special role in regional and in global context in conflict management and in conflict resolution. That is why it is important for Brussels to develop relations with real pro-European political forces and experts from civil societies of neighboring countries (including from Moldova), in order to help those countries (nations), not dubious (corrupted) political regimes.

The amplification of the Russian factor in Eastern European region

It is well known that Russian federation is now in a period of military revival. That is why the Russian leadership takes measures in order to reinforce the Russian sphere of influence on the territories of the former Soviet Union (and even further – for example in Middle East). Russian President is already cold in Russia “collector of Russian lands” (собиратель земель русских). Moldova is one of targets in this context of the amplification of the Russian factor in Eastern European region (as well as in further important geopolitical areas).

Eastern Europe is a disputable space between Russia and West, especially after the affirmation of the European aspirations of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova (they all are parts of the Eastern Partnership – a program within the European Neighborhood Policy) and after signing association agreements by these three countries.  

One of the instruments used by Russia in order to stop the exit of the former Soviet republics from the Russian sphere of influence is the inspiration and the informational, financial, logistical, military support of separatist movements in neighboring countries. First this instrument was used in Republic of Moldova, in Georgia, and finally in Ukraine. It is now recognized by many experts, military stuff and state officials that Russia carries out a hybrid war against some former Soviet countries, in order: to stop their aspirations of European integration (mainly, it is about Ukraine, Georgia and Republic of Moldova). A hybrid war [4] means:

1. To use the Russian speaking minorities from those countries as a fifths column, in order to destabilize the political situation from the society,

2. To use propaganda (an information warfare), also to destabilize the internal situation from the target country (which is an assault on societal security of the country).

3. To use intelligence methods in order to collect information ant to influence political leadership and societies perception of the target countries.

A hybrid war is always an asymmetric one, a war aimed at using all means before the involvement of the military troops.

Moldova is a target country and that is why it is in great danger. Unfortunately, the “pro-European” governance seems not to realize the danger.      

In contemporary historical period, we can see a process of transition of international security system, from the unipolar to multipolar one. It is undoubted, that in these conditions, Russia wants to be an international/geopolitical power pole, together with USA, China, and other emerging countries. That is why, Kremlin will not accept to withdraw its influence, its military presence from the territories, which once where part of the Russian (Tsarist) Empire and of Soviet Union. Even in the context of facing of some financial problems by Russia, after the annexation of Crimea and in the context of supporting of the 5 million population from Lugansk and Donetsk Eastern regions of Ukraine, together with the enormous costs of the Russian military operation in Syria, Russia will not accept to yield Transnistrian region to Moldova. That shows the importance of the external factor within the process of searching of a lasting solution to the Transnistrian conflict.

Conclusions

The most important geopolitical canter of the Western civilization is Washington.  After the D. Trump's election, the community of experts in security field expected some changes in US approach to security issues over the world, including Eastern Europe. However, eventually, Trump’s administration has taken over the major lines of US foreign policy, ensuring continuity. Now can be seen contradictions between Russia and USA, NATO and EU (the collective West). In the context of Russia – West contradictions, the Transnistrian conflict is a point of a low interest, in comparison with Ukraine, Syria and North Korea. Still, Transnistria and Moldova as a whole, is a bridgehead for Russia in Balkan direction – in a region where traditionally Moscow had political interests in Slavic and orthodox countries. That is why Russia will use all means to stop the process of conflict resolution, in order to help the Tiraspol’s regime to strengthen its control on the territory.

In these conditions, it is obvious that a change of the Russia’s status in 5+2 format of negotiations on Transnistrian conflict resolution, from mediator and guarantor to a part of the conflict (as the Russian president Boris Yeltsin signed the Peace Agreement from 21 July 1992), will transform the format of negotiations into an mechanism better corresponding to reality. This would be very helpful in the attempt to find a solution to the conflict in the international format of negotiations. 

However, the main problems, which must be solved in order to face effectively Transnistrian conflict, are internal: corruption, embezzlement, the lack of a state vision, of a state project, of the state building, of an effective economic development, which makes Moldova unattractive for Transnistrian population, even if Russia would express the readiness to withdraw its military troops from the region.           

Bibliography

1.      Filip, Corneliu, Dosarul transnistrean. Istoria unui «conflict înghețat», Editura Institutului de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale, București, 2011

2.      Ghica, Luciana Alexandra; Zulean, Marian, Politica de securitate națională. Concepte, instituții, procese, Polirom, Iași, 2010

3.      Kerikmae, T.; Chochia A., (eds.), Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy, Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2016

4.      Kissinger, Henry, Ordinea mondială, Rao, București, 2015.

5.      Neag, Mihai Marcel, A new tipology of war: the Hybrid War, ”Revista Academiei Forțelor Terestre”, Sibiu, 1(81) / 2016

6.      Nye, Jr. Joseph S., Viitorul puterii, Polirom, Iași, 2012

7.      Simileanu, Vasile, Conflicte asimetrice [Asymmetric Conflicts], Editura Top Form, București, 2011

8.      Străuțiu, Eugen, The Transnistrian Conflict Files, Techno Media, Sibiu 2017

9.      Străuțiu, Eugen; Tabără, Vasile, A comparative analysis of the development of the two banks of the Dniester. Implemented policies, desirable policies, Techno Media, Sibiu, 2015.

10.  Țăranu, Anatol; Gribincea, Mihai, Conflictul transnistrean. Culegere de documente şi materiale. Vol. I (1989-1993).- 598p.; Vol. II (1993-2002).- 638p., Lexon-Prim, Chișinău, 2013

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[1] Examples analysed from Corneliu, Filip, Dosarul transnistrean. Istoria unui «conflict înghețat» Editura Institutului de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale, București, 2011, passim; Eugen Străuțiu, The Transnistrian Conflict Files, Technomedia, Sibiu 2017, passim; Eugen Străuțiu, Vasile Tabără, A comparative analysis of the development of the two banks of the Dniester. Implemented policies, desirable policies, Technomedia, Sibiu, 2015, passim.

[2] For context: Anatol Țăranu, Mihai Gribincea, Conflictul transnistrean. Culegere de documente şi materiale. Vol. I (1989-1993).- 598p.; Vol. II (1993-2002).- 638p., Editura Lexon-Prim, Chișinău, 2013.

[3] See Tanel Kerikmae, Dimensions and Implications of Eastern Partnership Policy: Introduction, in T. Kerikmae, A. Chochia (eds.), Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy, Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2016.

[4] An approach: Mihai Marcel Neag, A new tipology of war: the Hybrid War, ”Revista Academiei Forțelor Terestre”, Sibiu, 1(81) / 2016, pp. 14-20.