Aniversarea a 96-ea a Republicii Moldovenești din stânga Nistrului: de ce am pierdut Transnistria

Astăzi se împlinesc 96 de ani de la crearea Republicii Autonome Moldovenești (RASSM – creată la 12 octombrie 1924) pe malul stâng al Nistrului. A fost recunoașterea prezenței elementului etnic moldovenesc în spațiul de peste Nistru, dar și încununarea eforturilor unor comandanți militari moldoveni din armata sovietică (Cotovschi, Frunze ș.a.), cu privire la instituționalizarea comunității moldovenești de acolo. A fost greu, pentru că se pare că moldovenii noștri de peste Nistru nu aveau la acel moment o conștiință de sine care să le permită crearea unei republici – nu aveau statalitatea în mentalitatea lor, în modul lor de viață. 

Oricum, republica a fost creată. La 4 noiembrie 1940 ea a fost dezmembrată – partea de vest, cu o populație moldovenească compactă, a intrat în componența Republicii Sovietice Moldovenești (RSSM), iar partea de est a devenit parte a regiunii Odesa din Ucraina.  

Ce bilanț avem acum, la 96 de ani? Actualmente statul Republica Moldova deține controlul a numai șase sate de pe malul stâng al Nistrului (Molovata Nouă, Cocieri; Coșnița, Pîrîta, Pohrebea, Doroțcaia). Cea mai mare parte a „raioanelor de est” intră în nerecunoscuta Republică Moldovenească Nistreană (RMN) – denumirea prescurtată adoptată de cei de la Tiraspol: Nistrenia, termen neutilizat în spațiul mediatic și politic de pe malul drept al Nistrului. E bine că cineva este optimist și a păstrat denumirea de „raion Dubăsari” pentru structura teritorială în care intră cele șase sate, dar mai realist ar fi ca până la reintegrare să fie atribuit un oraș ca reședință de raion – de exemplu Vadul lui Vodă (respectiv să avem raionul Vadul lui Vodă). Și oricum, chiar și după reintegrare, nu se știe dacă locuitorii celor șase sate vor dori să facă parte din autonomia nistreană – din raionul cu reședința în Dubăsari. La Tiraspol și în toată Nistrenia activează o Societate a Moldovenilor, dar autoritățile de la Chișinău nu au relații cu membrii (conducerea) societății, ca și cum aceia ar fi niște străini (de neam și țară). La televiziunea de stat din Tiraspol sunt difuzate emisiuni de știri ș.a. în limba moldovenească. Ele ar putea fi preluate de televiziunea publică de la Chișinău, pentru a contribui la integrarea prin cunoaștere reciprocă a moldovenilor de pe ambele maluri ale Nistrului. Vajnicii guvernanți și „experți” (din Chișinău) în soluționarea conflictului n-au treabă cu așa ceva. În zona nistreană autoritățile RM monitorizează starea celor șase școli cu predarea în limba moldovenească în baza grafiei latine din zonă. Dar activitatea celor aproximativ 35 de școli cu predarea în limba moldovenească în baza grafiei chirilice nu prezintă interes pentru guvernanții de la Chișinău. Se manifestă un fenomen interesant: statul rus ajută școlile cu predarea în limba rusă din Nistrenia, statul ucrainean ajută școlile cu predarea în limba ucraineană din Nistrenia, România ajută școlile cu predarea în limba română (cele șase menționate) din Nistrenia, iar cele aproximativ 35 de școli cu predarea în limba moldovenească (pe baza grafiei chirilice) sunt ale nimănui, pentru că în guvernarea din Chișinău, a Republicii Moldova, nu există moldoveni care să își asume destinul moldovenilor din Nistrenia. Desigur, atitudinea aceasta a autorităților „moldovenești” de la Chișinău față de moldovenii din Nistrenia nu contribuie la crearea unei imagini pozitive a guvernanților de la Chișinău în ochii administrației de la Tiraspol. Ei pe drept se pot întreba: dacă „moldovenii” din guvernul de la Chișinău îi tratează așa pe moldovenii lor de la noi, de ce să credem că ne vor trata mai bine pe noi toți (comunitatea rusofonă) în condițiile reintegrării?; pentru ce ne mai trebuie reintegrare? Desigur, atitudinea autorităților de la Chișinău nu contribuie nici la o imagine a unor oameni demni și inteligenți în ochii factorilor de decizie de la Moscova și Kiev, cei de acolo privind statul moldovenesc (fără Nistrenia) ca o formațiune temporară (dacă nu există preocupare față de moldovenii transnistreni).

Candidatul electoral la prezidențiale Igor Dodon este singurul care a declarat că își propune să-și dedice al doilea mandat soluționării problemei „transnistrene”. Îi dorim succes, dar fără oameni competenți și patrioți acest lucru este imposibil, oricât ar declara că vrea.

Este regretabil că astăzi conducerea de la Chișinău nu felicită cetățenii din raioanele de est cu aniversarea a 96-ea a Republici Moldovenești de pe malul stâng al Nistrului, că nu sunt dedicate republicii respective emisiuni la posturile publice de televiziune și radio, mai ales în contextul abordării procesului de reintegrare. De conferințe științifice consacrate problematicii respective nici nu mai are rost să amintesc.

O țară poate să piardă o parte din teritoriul său când pierde încrederea populației de acolo (față de autoritățile centrale).

Felicitări moldovenilor de pe malul stâng al Nistrului cu aniversarea republici lor! Dumnezeu nu v-a părăsit, iar El poate da minte și suflet și guvernanților de la Chișinău. Avem o problemă cu mintea cea de pe urmă a moldovenilor. Să sperăm totuși că nu va fi prea târziu.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AT THE EU’s EATERN BORDERS: AMPLIFICATION OF THE RUSSIAN FACTOR

Communication at the international conference "The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Security Challenges", 26-27 April 2018, Chișinău. Published in "The European Union and Eastern partnership: Security Challenges", ECSA, Chisinau, 2018, P. 179-184: http://www.studiieu.org/files/publications/EUSEC_book_2018_pdf.pdf

Abstract: Since 2007, Russia has made big steps towards strengthening its military potential. For president V. Putin, the collapse of the USSR was the biggest tragedy of the 20^th century (25 million of Russians remained outside Russia’s borders). At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin signaled to the West that he was seeking to restore his country’s world power status, which the US should have to take into account in an international multipolar system. Recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the annexation of Crimea, the support for Lugansk and Donetsk separatist regions constituted an evidence of Russia’s decision to restore its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. Putin has recommended himself as a “territory assembler”. If the Kremlin succeeded in restoring control over the post-Soviet states (such as Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine), the following could be the post-socialist states of Central and South-Eastern Europe – even if they are members of NATO and the EU. Brussels must manage the amplification of the Russian factor in the post-Soviet space as it has become a threat to European security. It is necessary to develop regional security architecture.

Keywords: security, European Union, Russian Federation, Eastern Europe, Republic of Moldova.

Introduction

We live in a time of transformations in international relations environment. The world order is in a deep process of changes. A few new power centers – namely China and Russia – rise in some regions of the world, triggering the transition from the unipolar to the multipolar international system and from liberal to realist paradigm of development. China’s importance has been highlighted long time ago, in the period of the Cold War. In his book “The Analysis of International Relations”, published in 1968, the American researcher Karl W. Deutsch mentioned: “Nowadays, the idea of changing – or maintaining – “world order” through unilateral actions (the concept of “unilateralism”, so called by regretted professor Charles Lerche) can be taken seriously only by the United States, the Soviet Union and, perhaps, by communist China.”[1] Karl W. Deutsch called the three mentioned countries “these three world giants”. Those three are giants even now. More than that, it is interesting that in the present, the mentioned three giants are representatives of three ideologies: US – liberal democracy, China – communism, and Russia – conservatism or traditionalism (at least, Russia’s leadership pretends this). In fact, Russia and China are countries with authoritarian political regimes in comparison with the Western liberal democratic countries: the US, the EU and NATO members and others.

In the present, the Russian Federation is in a process of consolidation of its international status and of its sphere of influence. In this context, it appears like a revisionist country, trying to undertake the revision of the world order, established after the Cold War. A prime aim for Kremlin is to keep the post-Soviet space (except the Baltic States) under its control after the loss of former socialist countries – Soviet Union satellites, from the socialist system, and the Baltic States, which are now within NATO and the European Union. A second aim could be the recuperation of the Baltic States and of some other countries from former socialist system, controlled once by Moscow.

That is why Russian actions pose a threat to NATO and EU security. The United States of America are deeply involved in security ensuring for NATO and EU members. As a result, in the current period, we are witnessing a confrontation between Russia and the West (NATO and the EU). At this stage, the interaction between two centers of power can be qualified as a hybrid war, an important component of which is information and cyber warfare.

Consolidation of the Russia’s sphere of influence: some tools

Russia uses a few instruments in order to keep and to strengthen its control in the post-Soviet space. There are three countries, which suffered from violent actions of Moscow. First, in 1992, imperial and nationalist Russian forces triggered a war in the Dniester region against the Republic of Moldova, in order to preserve under the Russian control the so-called Transnistrian region of Moldova, using the 14^th Soviet army from Tiraspol, which did not withdraw until now.[2] A second moment of pressure of Russia on another former Soviet republic was in 2008, when Moscow committed an aggression against Georgia, “defending” South Ossetia from Tbilisi. After the war, Russia recognized the “independence” of two Georgian autonomous republics: South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The third moment was in 2014, when Russia annexed the Ukrainian autonomous republic of Crimea and started supporting the Eastern separatist self-proclaimed the people’s republic of Lugansk and Donetsk – the conflict is still going on.

All tree intervention of Russia in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine were possible due to creating and supporting separatist republics. This instrument has shown its efficiency during the last decades. In post-Soviet area, Russia created a few such unrecognized states: Moldovan Nistrian Republic in Moldova; South Ossetia and Abkhazian republics in Georgia; and Lugansk and Donetsk People’s republics in Ukraine (excepting the Republic of Crimea, incorporated or annexed by Russia in 2014). It can be added also Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in Azerbaijan.

Although Russia used almost the same scenario in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, the scenario had specific features in each of the three post-Soviet republics. Russia frozen the conflict in Moldova and didn’t recognize the “independence” of Moldovan Nistrian Republic (Transnistria); Russia recognized the “independence” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and Russia annexed Crimea, but does not recognize the “independence” of Lugansk and Donetsk People’s republics in Ukraine. Of course, there are clear explanations for each approach of Russia regarding each of the three post-Soviet republics. It is understandable that having internal conflicts (sustained by Russia) – territorial problems – Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine cannot be accepted in NATO and the EU. That is why the scenario of frozen conflicts – the scenario of “Transnistrisation” – is useful for Kremlin in achieving its goals in the post-Soviet area.

In the context of amplification of the Russian factor, the objective is to restore the international status of Russia as a regional center of power. Kremlin uses a few tools on post-Soviet republics, trying to control them more and more, in order to demonstrate the Russian power – the high capacity of controlling its near neighborhood – its sphere of influence. In all three mentioned post-Soviet countries, Moscow strategists used almost the same scenario: creating of new separatist republics – Moldovan Nistrian Republic in Moldova; South Ossetia and Abkhazian republics in Georgia; and Lugansk and Donetsk People’s republics in Ukraine. Even the Russian involvement in Syrian conflict, by supporting the President Bashar al Assad, can be approached from the point of view of strengthening the position of Russia in the post-Soviet space: Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The Syrian front, with the Russian participation, is an instrument to determine NATO (the US and other European states, such as Germany and France) to recognize the annexation of Crimea and the federalization of Ukraine, a state which should become weaker and more controlled by Kremlin, for example, through federalization.

Moldova’s security in the context of amplification of the Russian Factor

The Republic of Moldova is a country in Eastern Europe, with some specific advantages in relation with Russia (in comparison with some other post-Soviet countries, especially such as Georgia and Ukraine). First of all is that Moldova does not have a common (Russian-Moldovan) border. Still, Moscow can influence the Republic of Moldova, its politics, by presence of the Russian troops in Transnistrian region of Moldova (by frozen Transnistrian conflict), by the access or restriction on the Russian market for Moldovan migrants searching jobs, agricultural products, natural gas supplies, being a monopolistic provider.

Unfortunately, because of some internal problems (first of all, embezzlement and corruption), the young Moldovan state has not succeeded to finish the transition from totalitarian Soviet regime to democracy and a functional market economy. Moldova still is the poorest European country, with deep economic and social problems. As a result, thousands of Moldovan citizens leave abroad to find jobs in order to sustain their families from Moldova.[3]

The Moldovan society is divided into two geopolitically oriented large groups (almost equal) by the criteria of vector of development: pro-West (pro European integration) and pro-East (pro Eurasian integration). The Moldovan identity is weak; by the identity criteria population is also divided into “Moldovans” (calling their mother tongue: “Moldovan” language) and “Romanians” (calling their mother tongue – the same language: Romanian). Nevertheless, there are a few ethnic minorities – Russians (mostly in Transnistria), Ukrainians (mostly in the Northern part of the country), Gagauzes and Bulgarians (in the South), very dedicated to Russia (in the Soviet times, in their regions of living, they were undergone to a russification process through kindergartens and schools with the Russian language of teaching).

Since 1991 (the year of independence proclamation of the Republic of Moldova) until now, Moldovan authorities have not formulated a state (regional) mission as a part of the country project.[4]

All these elements make Moldova vulnerable for foreign challenges. During the military operations in Donbas, in 2014, in the Russian media was discussed the plan of creation of the province Novorosia: from Lugansk and Donetsk to Transnistria (including it). Although the plan was abandoned, it can be reactivated at any time.

Although Moldova is largely dependent on the Russian labor market and on the Russian agricultural products market, the political Moldovan-Russian relations are not the best. The illegal presence of the Russian troops in Transnistria (the frozen Transnistrian conflict), the embargos or restrictions for Moldovan agricultural products on the Russian markets are a few elements, which maintain tensions within the diplomatic dialogue. As an associated country to the European Union, Brussels should help Moldova in its interaction with Russia. In the context of amplification of the Russian factor in Eastern Europe, Russia is a threat to Chisinau authorities. It is obvious that Kremlin wants to reconquer Moldova in its sphere of influence, as a former Soviet republic – part of the Russian empire and of the Soviet Union, whose successor is Russia today.

Conclusions

From the moment of the President Vladimir Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference and especially after the Russian invasion in Georgia, in the province of South Ossetia, Russia constitutes a factor of regional destabilization in its attempt to keep the post-Soviet space (except the Baltic States) under its control and to consolidate its status of a regional center of power. The amplification of the Russian factor is a threat to NATO and EU security, but, first of all, to some post-Soviet republics, such as Moldova. Of course, a sincere dialogue between Brussels and Moscow is required. Anti-Russian economic sanctions are not so effective until now. Therefore, it is necessary to elaborate a special European strategy of interaction with Russia, especially regarding the post-Soviet countries from the Eastern Partnership (EaP) of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) of the EU. Three of them – Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine – signed association agreements (including free trade agreements) with the EU and showed their commitment to forward on the path of European integration.[5] However, in the association agreement there are not any security guarantees, these states being exposed to the dangers from Russia.

As security challenges, common for Eastern Partnership countries and European Union members, the cooperation between them concerning regional security should be systematic and with an emphasis on practical perspectives.

It would be appropriate to include the above mentioned three countries in the European security strategy. The East European regional security architecture should be agreed between Brussels, Moscow and Washington, subjects that should provide security guarantees for countries from the region. A peaceful Eastern Europe can be an important factor of peaceful development both of the EU and Russia (Eurasian Economic Union).

Nowadays the Republic of Moldova does not have a clear mission, regarding its regional role. The duty of Moldovan authorities is to elaborate the mission of the state, which should be a part of the country project. This would contribute to the assurance of the societal security of the Republic of Moldova.[6]

Bibliography

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. Securitatea: un nou cadru de analiză, Cluj-Napoca: CA Publishing, 2011.

Cioroianu, Adrian. Geopolitica Matrioșcăi – Rusia postsovietică în noua ordine mondială. București: Curtea Veche, 2009.

Deutsch, Karl W. Analiza relațiilor internaționale. Chișinău: Tehnica-Info, 2006.

Lavric, Aurelian. “Misiunea statului moldovenesc: de la origini până în present.” [Moldovan state mission: from the origins to present] Statalitatea Moldovei: Continuitatea istorică şi perspectiva dezvoltării (2017): 127-143.

Lavric, Aurelian. “Moldova in the context of EU’s Eastern Neighborhood: the Problem of the Regional Security Architecture.” Studia Securitatis 1 (2017): 32-43.

Сакович, В. А. Национальная безопасность Республики Молдова. Chișinău: Print-Caro, 2016.

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[1] Karl W. Deutsch, Analiza relațiilor internaționale (Chișinău: Tehnica-Info, 2006), 88.

[2] Adrian Cioroianu, Geopolitica Matrioșcăi – Rusia postsovietică în noua ordine mondială (București: Curtea Veche, 2009), 152.

[3] В. А. Сакович, Национальная безопасность Республики Молдова (Chișinău: Print-Caro, 2016).

[4] Aurelian Lavric, “Misiunea statului moldovenesc: de la origini până în present,” [Moldovan state mission: from the origins to present] Statalitatea Moldovei: Continuitatea istorică şi perspectiva dezvoltării (2017): 127-143.

[5] Aurelian Lavric, “Moldova in the context of EU’s Eastern Neighborhood: the Problem of the Regional Security Architecture,” Studia Securitatis 1 (2017): 32-43.

[6] Barry, Buzan Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Securitatea: un nou cadru de analiză (Cluj-Napoca: CA Publishing, 2011).

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TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF RUSSIA – WEST CONTRADICTIONS

Article published in: Anuarul Laboratorului pentru analiza conflictului transnistrean, Volume I, No. 1 / 2017, Sibiu, Romania, pp. 41-45. 

Abstract: The domestic vulnerabilities first maintain unresolved the Transnistrian conflict since 1992 until now. The lack of effective governance (the stolen $ billion from National Bank) has made the Moldovan state not attractive for the population from Transnistrian area. However, external factors play also an important role. Lately, changes have taken place in regional and global security environment: amplification of the Russian factor, re-shaping of the role of EU after Brexit, changes in US approach to security issues after D. Trump's election. Experts in Transnistrian conflict analysis should take into account all these elements, together with the internal ones.

Keywords: Transnistrian Conflict, Security Environment, Republic of Moldova, External Factors, Russian Federation, European Union, Romania.

Introduction 

There are premises to say that domestic vulnerabilities are the ones that maintain unresolved the Transnistrian conflict from 1992 to the present [1]. The lack of effective governance has made the territory, controlled by the Chisinau authorities, to be not attractive for the population from Transnistrian area. The one billion US dollars, stolen from the reserves of the National Bank of Moldova (with the subsequent abolition of the largest, the only state commercial bank – Banca de Economii a Moldovei [BEM], the concession of Chisinau international airport and the concession of the southern part of the republic, in dubious conditions, for the exploration of shale gas, have made the inhabitants of Transnistria to look cautiously to the Republic of Moldova. However, indisputable, the external factor plays a very important role in the Transnistrian conflict. In the last period, changes have taken place in the regional (Eastern Europe) and global security environment: Russian factor amplification, changing the US approach tom security issues after President Donald Trump's election, re-shaping the role of the EU after Brexit and others. All these elements affect the situation on the banks of the Nistru River and, together with the internal ones, should be taken into account by experts in Transnistrian conflict analysis.

That is why the Transnistrian conflict should be analyzed in the context of the changes in regional and global security environment. One of the perspectives is to look at it through the prism of European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in the context of the Russia – West contradictions, completed with sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia after the annexation of the Crimea and supporting the rebel troops in Eastern Ukraine. Russia also responded with sanctions – with restrictions on EU food imports.

The EU role in Conflict Resolution in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries: the Moldovan case

The European Union as a collective of its member states is concerned with conflicts from its neighborhood, because the security from this area is a condition of its own security and wealth (prosperity). The EU is vitally interested in having as neighbors a community of values, such as democracy, human rights, rule of law etc., which is a guaranty for stable development and for modernization of any country.

Among the EU neighbors are fragile and conflict-affected countries. One of these states is the Republic of Moldova, which, since 1992, faces a frozen conflict in the Eastern part of its territory [2]. Unfortunately, Chisinau authorities have difficulties in addressing effectively the conflict; they do not have a vision and, respectively, a strategy for conflict resolution. More than that, businesses with economic agents from uncontrolled territory bring income to legal authorities, that is why there is a lack of political will to solve the conflict.       

The European Union has clear interests in stabilizing its Eastern neighborhood. However, since now, its action beyond its boundaries has been limited. The experience from the Eastern Partnership Program [3] showed that the financial assistance – for governments of neighboring countries, which declared themselves “pro-European integration”, but in fact are suspected of corruption and embezzlement by domestic societies and by international actors – is not quite effective in helping the societies from those countries. EU must find other, more effective, ways to contribute to the stabilization and modernization of those countries. Understanding very well that the conflicts outside the Union, at the EU borders, are dangerous and are potential outbreaks for the EU destabilization, Brussels must participate in conflict management and in conflict resolution – in finding solutions for the conflicts.

Undoubtedly, EU must have an efficient approach to conflicts and crises in fragile and conflict-affected countries, to contribute to their development, by designing and applying a common strategic vision of conflict prevention (before crises emerge or violence erupts). From the perspective of societies from the Eastern European countries, which want to become parts of the European family, EU is the only supporter, which can help by imposing conditions on authorities from their own countries.

Still, the European Neighborhood Policy and the European Security Strategy must take into account the specificity of fragile states, which, in many cases are captured (the state institutions are captured by some oligarchic groups). Often, to help from outside a captured state means to help the oligarchic regime from that state.

The EU is an important actor, which plays and will play a special role in regional and in global context in conflict management and in conflict resolution. That is why it is important for Brussels to develop relations with real pro-European political forces and experts from civil societies of neighboring countries (including from Moldova), in order to help those countries (nations), not dubious (corrupted) political regimes.

The amplification of the Russian factor in Eastern European region

It is well known that Russian federation is now in a period of military revival. That is why the Russian leadership takes measures in order to reinforce the Russian sphere of influence on the territories of the former Soviet Union (and even further – for example in Middle East). Russian President is already cold in Russia “collector of Russian lands” (собиратель земель русских). Moldova is one of targets in this context of the amplification of the Russian factor in Eastern European region (as well as in further important geopolitical areas).

Eastern Europe is a disputable space between Russia and West, especially after the affirmation of the European aspirations of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova (they all are parts of the Eastern Partnership – a program within the European Neighborhood Policy) and after signing association agreements by these three countries.  

One of the instruments used by Russia in order to stop the exit of the former Soviet republics from the Russian sphere of influence is the inspiration and the informational, financial, logistical, military support of separatist movements in neighboring countries. First this instrument was used in Republic of Moldova, in Georgia, and finally in Ukraine. It is now recognized by many experts, military stuff and state officials that Russia carries out a hybrid war against some former Soviet countries, in order: to stop their aspirations of European integration (mainly, it is about Ukraine, Georgia and Republic of Moldova). A hybrid war [4] means:

1. To use the Russian speaking minorities from those countries as a fifths column, in order to destabilize the political situation from the society,

2. To use propaganda (an information warfare), also to destabilize the internal situation from the target country (which is an assault on societal security of the country).

3. To use intelligence methods in order to collect information ant to influence political leadership and societies perception of the target countries.

A hybrid war is always an asymmetric one, a war aimed at using all means before the involvement of the military troops.

Moldova is a target country and that is why it is in great danger. Unfortunately, the “pro-European” governance seems not to realize the danger.      

In contemporary historical period, we can see a process of transition of international security system, from the unipolar to multipolar one. It is undoubted, that in these conditions, Russia wants to be an international/geopolitical power pole, together with USA, China, and other emerging countries. That is why, Kremlin will not accept to withdraw its influence, its military presence from the territories, which once where part of the Russian (Tsarist) Empire and of Soviet Union. Even in the context of facing of some financial problems by Russia, after the annexation of Crimea and in the context of supporting of the 5 million population from Lugansk and Donetsk Eastern regions of Ukraine, together with the enormous costs of the Russian military operation in Syria, Russia will not accept to yield Transnistrian region to Moldova. That shows the importance of the external factor within the process of searching of a lasting solution to the Transnistrian conflict.

Conclusions

The most important geopolitical canter of the Western civilization is Washington.  After the D. Trump's election, the community of experts in security field expected some changes in US approach to security issues over the world, including Eastern Europe. However, eventually, Trump’s administration has taken over the major lines of US foreign policy, ensuring continuity. Now can be seen contradictions between Russia and USA, NATO and EU (the collective West). In the context of Russia – West contradictions, the Transnistrian conflict is a point of a low interest, in comparison with Ukraine, Syria and North Korea. Still, Transnistria and Moldova as a whole, is a bridgehead for Russia in Balkan direction – in a region where traditionally Moscow had political interests in Slavic and orthodox countries. That is why Russia will use all means to stop the process of conflict resolution, in order to help the Tiraspol’s regime to strengthen its control on the territory.

In these conditions, it is obvious that a change of the Russia’s status in 5+2 format of negotiations on Transnistrian conflict resolution, from mediator and guarantor to a part of the conflict (as the Russian president Boris Yeltsin signed the Peace Agreement from 21 July 1992), will transform the format of negotiations into an mechanism better corresponding to reality. This would be very helpful in the attempt to find a solution to the conflict in the international format of negotiations. 

However, the main problems, which must be solved in order to face effectively Transnistrian conflict, are internal: corruption, embezzlement, the lack of a state vision, of a state project, of the state building, of an effective economic development, which makes Moldova unattractive for Transnistrian population, even if Russia would express the readiness to withdraw its military troops from the region.           

Bibliography

1.      Filip, Corneliu, Dosarul transnistrean. Istoria unui «conflict înghețat», Editura Institutului de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale, București, 2011

2.      Ghica, Luciana Alexandra; Zulean, Marian, Politica de securitate națională. Concepte, instituții, procese, Polirom, Iași, 2010

3.      Kerikmae, T.; Chochia A., (eds.), Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy, Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2016

4.      Kissinger, Henry, Ordinea mondială, Rao, București, 2015.

5.      Neag, Mihai Marcel, A new tipology of war: the Hybrid War, ”Revista Academiei Forțelor Terestre”, Sibiu, 1(81) / 2016

6.      Nye, Jr. Joseph S., Viitorul puterii, Polirom, Iași, 2012

7.      Simileanu, Vasile, Conflicte asimetrice [Asymmetric Conflicts], Editura Top Form, București, 2011

8.      Străuțiu, Eugen, The Transnistrian Conflict Files, Techno Media, Sibiu 2017

9.      Străuțiu, Eugen; Tabără, Vasile, A comparative analysis of the development of the two banks of the Dniester. Implemented policies, desirable policies, Techno Media, Sibiu, 2015.

10.  Țăranu, Anatol; Gribincea, Mihai, Conflictul transnistrean. Culegere de documente şi materiale. Vol. I (1989-1993).- 598p.; Vol. II (1993-2002).- 638p., Lexon-Prim, Chișinău, 2013

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[1] Examples analysed from Corneliu, Filip, Dosarul transnistrean. Istoria unui «conflict înghețat» Editura Institutului de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale, București, 2011, passim; Eugen Străuțiu, The Transnistrian Conflict Files, Technomedia, Sibiu 2017, passim; Eugen Străuțiu, Vasile Tabără, A comparative analysis of the development of the two banks of the Dniester. Implemented policies, desirable policies, Technomedia, Sibiu, 2015, passim.

[2] For context: Anatol Țăranu, Mihai Gribincea, Conflictul transnistrean. Culegere de documente şi materiale. Vol. I (1989-1993).- 598p.; Vol. II (1993-2002).- 638p., Editura Lexon-Prim, Chișinău, 2013.

[3] See Tanel Kerikmae, Dimensions and Implications of Eastern Partnership Policy: Introduction, in T. Kerikmae, A. Chochia (eds.), Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy, Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2016.

[4] An approach: Mihai Marcel Neag, A new tipology of war: the Hybrid War, ”Revista Academiei Forțelor Terestre”, Sibiu, 1(81) / 2016, pp. 14-20.

Catalonia și Nistrenia (nerecunoscuta RMN): deosebiri ireconciliabile

Președintele parlamentului A. Candu ne-a delectat cu o reacție la proclamarea independenței de către Catalonia față de Spania. El a scris pe o rețea de socializare: „De peste 25 de ani, Republica Moldova simte pe propria piele ce înseamnă secesiune. Parlamentul Republicii Moldova susține pe deplin suveranitatea și integritatea teritorială a Regatului Spaniei”.

Nu a fost difuzată vreo știre cu privire la discutarea în parlamentul de la Chișinău a situației din Catalonia. Dacă într-adevăr legislativul nu a discutat subiectul, iar Candu scrie că „Parlamentul Republicii Moldova susține pe deplin” etc., această postare este încă o dovadă a capturării instituției legislative a statului moldovenesc de către gruparea din care face parte Candu. În al doilea rând, șeful parlamentului scrie că „De peste 25 de ani, Republica Moldova simte pe propria piele se înseamnă secesiune”, uitând că Republica Moldova a apărut prin secesiunea de fosta URSS. Sugerarea unei paralele între Nistrenia (autoproclamata și nerecunoscuta RMN) și Catalonia este cu totul deplasată. În Catalonia este vorba de un popor, care are tot dreptul la autodeterminare pe teritoriul său istoric. În Nistrenia nu este vorba de un popor – o etnice, ci de o comunitate formată din moldoveni, ucraineni și ruși. În timp ce catalanii își doresc independența față de Madrid pentru că dispun de un potențial economic ce le permite să se auto susțină (din punct de vedere economic proiectul statal catalan este fezabil), în Nistrenia fără o susținere substanțială din exterior nu poate fi vorba de supraviețuire „independentă”. În timp ce catalanii au toate condițiile pentru a se afirma etnic, economic etc. în cadrul Regatului Spaniol, nistrenii au față de guvernarea de la Chișinău suspiciunea că demnitarii RM vor să-i adauge la populația ținută în captivitate pentru a fi furată (nistrenii, de ex., nu vor să participe la restituirea miliardului furat din rezervele Băncii Naționale).

Era bine dacă președintele parlamentului se documenta înainte de a posta... sau consilierii săi, care îl expun într-o lumină atât de nepotrivită…       

Statele autoproclamate nerecunoscute sau parțial recunoscute: cum pot supraviețui?

Un stat autoproclamat, dar nerecunoscut (de statul din care vrea să se desprindă) sau parțial recunoscut (de alte state decât cel din care vrea să se desprindă) de regulă este un instrument de exercitare a influenței unei puteri regionale sau globale într-un anumit spațiu geopolitic.

Vezi relațiile:

SUA – Kosovo, Taiwan;

Rusia – Abhazia și Osetia de Sud, respectiv Republica Moldovenească Nistreană, respectiv RP Lugansk și RP Donețk, respectiv Karabahul de Munte (prin controlul asupra Armeniei);

Turcia – Ciprul de Nord.

Statele autoproclamate nerecunoscute sau parțial recunoscute (cu recunoaștere limitată) au șanse să se mențină ca entități politice numai beneficiind de sprijinul politic, financiar, logistic, militar al unei puteri globale sau regionale, instrumente de exercitare a influenței cărora și devin... Asemenea state supraviețuiesc dacă aceasta este în interesul unei puteri regionale sau globale. 

Catalonia este o excepție incredibilă, care, din păcate, confirmă regula… 

Misiunea Moldovei după Războiul Crimeii (1856): lecții pentru prezent

Războiul Crimeii (1853-1856) s-a soldat cu schimbări geopolitice semnificative în estul Europei și, în particular, pentru Principatul Moldovei. La acel război alături de Turcia împotriva Rusiei, pe care au învins-o, au luptat Franţa, Marea Britanie şi Sardinia. În 1856, după încheierea  Războiului Crimeii, a avut loc Congresul de Pace de la Paris. Una dintre hotărârile Congresului a stipulat retrocedarea de către Rusia către Principatul Moldova a districtelor Bolgrad, Ismail și Cahul, teritoriu pe care îl răpise de la Moldova prima oară în 1812. Totuși, la Congresul de la Berlin, din 1878, care a urmat războiului ruso-turc din 1877-1878, Rusia a recuperat acea parte din sudul Basarabiei.

Deși nu s-a implicat în război, Moldova, aflată sub suzeranitatea Turciei, a beneficiat de pe urma noii configurări geopolitice a Europei. Totuși, Moldova nu ar fi putut profita dacă puterile europene, învingătoare ale Rusiei, nu ar fi recunoscut dreptul istoric al Moldovei asupra celor trei districte din sudul Basarabiei: Bolgrad, Ismail și Cahul, care i-au fost retrocedate. Moldova primise și își asumase o misiune: era mandatată de puterile europene să vegheze și să asigure securitatea la gurile Dunării.

Momentul 1856 este de învățătură pentru actualul stat Republica Moldova. Eforturile autorităților moldovenești trebuie îndreptate, la etapa actuală, în primul rând spre reducerea vulnerabilitățlor, asigurarea securității țării noastre – fortificarea potențialului său economic și militar. În același timp, se impune o abordare realistă a prevederii constituționale privind neutralitatea: câtă vreme în zona nistreană a țării se află trupe străine (rusești) nu poate fi vorba despre neutralitate la modul practic. De fapt, autoritățile de la Chișinău ar trebui să declare cu claritate că statutul de neutralitate este condiționat de retragerea trupelor străine de pe teritoriul RM. Desigur, acest lucru poate avea loc în condițiile soluționării conflictului transnistrean. Iar soluționarea poate avea loc printr-un acord al marilor puteri și al organizațiilor cu vocație internațională și regională de securitate, atât asupra rezolvării conflictului transnistrean, asupra acordării de garanții de securitate, și, respectiv, asupra recunoașterii statutului de neutralitate al RM – cele trei elemente pot fi incluse într-un document (acord/tratat internațional).

Rămâne un lucru de făcut: autoritățile de la Chișinău să formuleze o misiune a statului moldovenesc, în care comunitatea internațională să creadă și care să asigure semnarea respectivului tratat asupra neutralității Republicii Moldova, inclusiv asupra acordării unor garanții de securitate și a soluționării conflictului transnistrean prin reintegrarea zonei respective în statul moldovenesc. Și misiunea trebuie să fie alta decât cea a exploatării și sărăcirii populației RM prin delapidări și corupție…